Appearance
Sūrah al-Taḥrīm, verses 1-2
يَا أَيُّهَا ٱلنَّبِيُّ لِمَ تُحَرِّمُ مَآ أَحَلَّ ٱللَّهُ لَكَ ۖ تَبْتَغِى مَرْضَاتَ أَزْوَٰجِكَ ۚ وَٱللَّهُ غَفُورٌ رَّحِيمٌ قَدْ فَرَضَ ٱللَّهُ لَكُمْ تَحِلَّةَ أَيْمَـٰنِكُمْ ۚ وَٱللَّهُ مَوْلَىٰكُمْ ۚ وَهُوَ ٱلْعَلِيمُ ٱلْحَكِيمُ
Yā ayyuhā an-nabiyyu lima tuḥarrimu mā aḥalla Allāhu laka tabtaghī marḍāta azwājik, wa-Allāhu ghafūrun raḥīm. Qad faraḍa Allāhu lakum taḥillata aymānikum, wa-Allāhu mawlākum, wa huwa al-ʿalīmu al-ḥakīm.
O Prophet! Why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you, seeking to please your wives? And Allah is all-forgiving, all-merciful. Allah has certainly sanctioned for you the absolution of your oaths, and Allah is your master, and He is the All-knowing, the All-wise.
Context and significance
The opening verses of Sūrah al-Taḥrīm raise several important questions that frame their study. What exactly was the Prophet forbidding himself, and why did Allah intervene with such urgency? How should the nature of this “forbidding” be understood—is it an act of sin, an oath, or simply a personal abstention? Why does the Qur’an place emphasis on “seeking to please your wives,” and what does this teach about the balance between domestic harmony and divine law? Furthermore, what principle is established by the declaration that Allah has already prescribed the dissolution of oaths?
The significance of these verses lies in the way they safeguard the integrity of divine legislation. Even though the context is personal, the divine reproach makes clear that no human being, not even the Prophet, can alter what Allah has permitted. At the same time, the passage highlights the Prophet’s humanity and his deep concern for his family, showing how personal acts could carry communal implications if left unchecked. By clarifying that such self-imposed restrictions are treated as oaths requiring expiation, these verses provide enduring guidance for the Muslim community: God alone defines the boundaries of the lawful and unlawful, and believers must take care not to blur them, even in acts motivated by goodwill or affection.
What the exegetes say
At a glance
The question: What was the Prophet’s “forbidding” of the lawful (a sin, a legal prohibition, or an oath of abstention), and why was he reproached for it?
Abul Aʿlā MawdūdīSees neither sin nor legal prohibition but a personal abstention with the force of an oath; reproached because, given his role, it could make something lawful seem forbidden to the community.
Al-QurṭubīReads his “I will not return to it” over the honey as an oath, not a real prohibition; the reproach marks tark al-awlā, not sin, teaching that none may forbid the lawful.
Al-ṬabarsīHolds it was a self-imposed restriction carrying the ruling of an oath, not declaring anything unlawful in religion; a gentle reproach (ʿitāb) that leaves his ʿiṣmah intact.
ʿAllāmah ṬabāṭabāʾīTakes the taḥrīm as a personal oath of abstention, not legislation, signalled by the address “nabī” rather than “rasūl”; the censure reaches the wives too; faraḍa lakum allows dissolving it by expiation.
How each exegete answers the question, in one line. Click a name to read his reading in full.
Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī
Mawdūdī interprets the opening of Sūrah al-Taḥrīm as a firm reproach from Allah to His Messenger, not in the form of a genuine question, but as a rhetorical expression of disapproval. The Qur’an declares: “O Prophet, why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you, seeking to please your wives? And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” Mawdūdī explains that this verse is not directed at the Prophet for committing a sin, but rather for adopting a course of self-denial that, if left unchecked, could have had misleading consequences for the Muslim community. Even though the Prophet did not make a lawful thing religiously or legally unlawful, his personal abstention from it, given his unique role as God’s Messenger, carried weight for his followers. If he abstained from something, the companions might have assumed that it was actually prohibited, or at the very least, undesirable. This could have introduced an element of confusion into the divine law, for it might have appeared that a lawful thing could be rendered unlawful by personal choice. Thus, Allah immediately corrected the matter, declaring that even the Messenger himself did not have authority to forbid what Allah had permitted.
Mawdūdī makes clear that this abstention was not motivated by personal desire or piety but arose in response to the wishes of some of the Prophet’s wives. The Qur’an itself mentions this cause, not simply to highlight the act of self-denial, but to underscore the responsibility of the Prophet’s household. In seeking to please his wives by promising to abstain, the Prophet inadvertently took a step that could mislead others about divine law. By mentioning the motive in the revelation, Allah also directed a subtle admonition to the wives, who had failed to recognize the delicate implications of their influence on the Messenger. Their pressure had led him into an action which, while born of affection, risked setting a precedent that blurred the clear boundary between what God alone declares lawful or unlawful.
As to the specific background, Mawdūdī records two main reports. The first relates to Māriyah al-Qibṭiyyah, the Coptic woman gifted to the Prophet after the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyyah. Māriyah’s beauty aroused jealousy among the Prophet’s wives, and according to some traditions, Ḥafṣah discovered the Prophet with her in her own chamber. In order to calm her anger, the Prophet vowed to abstain from Māriyah thereafter. Several reports to this effect circulate in the tafsīr tradition, though their transmission chains are weak and none are found in the six canonical collections of ḥadīth. Ibn Ḥajar and others suggested there was some truth to the story because of the variety of reports, yet scholars such as al-Nawawī, Ibn Ḥajar, and Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ leaned against its reliability.
The second account concerns the incident of honey and is much more soundly transmitted. As narrated by ʿĀ’ishah in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, the Prophet developed a habit of staying longer in the house of Zaynab bint Jaḥsh because she had received a gift of honey, and the Prophet enjoyed its sweetness. Out of jealousy, ʿĀ’ishah, Ḥafṣah, and some of the other wives devised a plan: whenever the Prophet visited them, they would remark that his breath carried the smell of maghāfīr, a plant with a foul odor that sometimes tainted honey. Sensitive to such matters, the Prophet resolved never to drink honey again and even declared that he had sworn an oath to that effect. This abstention, Mawdūdī argues, became the occasion for the revelation of the verse, and it is the account favored by the great majority of scholars, since it rests on authentic reports.
In either case, the divine correction carried broader implications. Mawdūdī stresses that the Prophet’s decision to deny himself a lawful pleasure was not a sin for which he was punished, but it was nevertheless unbecoming of his office. Allah reminded him that His Messenger’s life was a public model, and therefore no personal choice of abstinence should give the impression that divine law could be altered. Allah also reminded him of the principle of expiation for oaths set out in Sūrah al-Māʾidah (), instructing him to dissolve his vow and resume what had been lawful all along.
From this, important legal discussions arise. Jurists debated whether forbidding oneself a lawful thing counts as an oath requiring expiation. Some scholars, like Masrūq, Shaʿbī, and Ibn Jarīr, argued that it was meaningless unless explicitly made in the form of an oath, and therefore required no expiation unless accompanied by words of swearing. Others, such as the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs, drew a distinction between abstaining from food or clothing—which they considered meaningless—and abstaining from conjugal relations with one’s wife, which they treated as an oath demanding expiation. A third group, including figures like Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, Ibn Masʿūd, and Ibn ʿAbbās, along with the Ḥanafīs, maintained that any act of self-prohibition counts as an oath in itself, even if the wording of an oath is not used. This last view gained wide acceptance, since Allah Himself in this passage links the Prophet’s abstention with the principle of expiation for oaths.
In Mawdūdī’s reading, the incident offers several theological lessons. First, it demonstrates that no one has the authority to make lawful or unlawful apart from God. Even the Prophet could not legislate in this way, for his task was to deliver revelation, not to originate law from personal preference. Second, it reveals the Prophet’s extraordinary sensitivity to the feelings of his wives, a sensitivity so strong that it led him to promise abstinence for their sake. Yet divine correction ensured that his personal affection did not inadvertently alter the perception of divine law. Third, it shows how God’s mercy works: Allah did not punish His Messenger but gently corrected him, forgave him, and reaffirmed His wisdom and authority.
Source: The Meaning of the Qur’an, vol. 14, trans. Ch. Muhammad Akbar, ed. A. A. Kamal (Lahore: Islamic Publications), commentary on Q. 66:1-2.
Al-Qurṭubī
Al-Qurṭubī explores the circumstances that led to this divine reproach of the Prophet (s.a.w.). He notes that several reports exist, but that their strength and coherence differ.
The most prominent account, preserved in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, relates to the incident of honey. The Prophet (s.a.w.) would drink honey at the house of Zaynab bint Jaḥsh and linger there. Out of jealousy, ʿĀʾishah and Ḥafṣah conspired with other wives, agreeing that whichever of them he entered upon should tell him that his breath carried the odor of maghāfīr (a gum of unpleasant smell). When confronted, the Prophet (s.a.w.) denied eating maghāfīr but admitted to drinking honey and then said: “I will not return to it, and I have sworn—do not tell anyone.” According to al-Qurṭubī, this is the strongest and most authentic narration, and it explains the verse as God’s gentle correction of the Prophet for renouncing something lawful in order to please his wives.
A second interpretation, reported from Ibn ʿAbbās and ʿIkrimah, claims that the verse concerns a woman who offered herself in marriage to the Prophet (s.a.w.), but whom he declined. Al-Qurṭubī dismisses this report as weak, noting both the lack of reliable transmitters and the fact that rejecting a proposal does not constitute an actual prohibition of something lawful.
A third view, found in some historical works, associates the verse with Māriyah the Copt. According to these narrations, the Prophet (s.a.w.) was once with Māriyah in the house of Ḥafṣah during her absence. When Ḥafṣah returned and objected, he assured her that Māriyah was forbidden to him, swearing not to approach her again, and asked her not to disclose the matter. Though this report has a somewhat stronger chain than the second account, it is not found in the Ṣaḥīḥ collections and is transmitted with interruptions. Some scholars of Mālik’s school accepted it as plausible, but al-Qurṭubī ultimately considers it secondary to the honey narrative.
After laying out these variants, al-Qurṭubī turns to the legal question of whether the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) act constituted a binding prohibition. He explains that if a man declares something lawful to be “forbidden” for himself, the act does not by itself make it unlawful. At most, it attaches the ruling of an oath, requiring expiation. This is why God follows the verse with the statement: “Allah has prescribed for you the absolution of your oaths” (). Thus, the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) declaration, “I will not return to it,” was treated as an oath, not as a true prohibition of the lawful.
On the broader theological level, al-Qurṭubī explains that the divine reproach here does not indicate sin in the Prophet (s.a.w.), but rather leaving what was more appropriate (tark al-awlā). It was an act of human sensitivity—seeking the satisfaction of his wives—that God corrected to teach the ummah that no one may declare unlawful what He has made lawful. The phrase, “And Allah is All-Forgiving, All-Merciful,” reassures that the Prophet (s.a.w.) was not held accountable beyond this gentle admonition.
In conclusion, al-Qurṭubī affirms that the honey narrative is the soundest explanation of the verse. The Prophet (s.a.w.) sought to please his wives by renouncing something lawful, but God clarified that His law cannot be altered by personal inclination. At the same time, the verse demonstrates God’s mercy toward His Messenger, reminding the community that such moments are not sins but instances of preferring harmony where firmness in divine law was the better course.
Source: Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī), Vol. 21, under Surah Al-Tahrim, Ayahs 1-2, Pub. by Al-Risalah Foundation, Beirut.
Al-Ṭabarsī
In his commentary on the opening of Sūrah al-Taḥrīm, Al-Ṭabarsī situates the verses within the context of a domestic incident in which the Prophet (ṣ) forbade himself something that Allah had permitted, either honey offered by one of his wives or his concubine Māriyah.
Al-Ṭabarsī makes it clear that this incident does not amount to sin in any sense that would compromise the Prophet’s ʿiṣmah (infallibility). Rather, the matter concerns the Prophet’s personal abstinence from something lawful in order to maintain harmony in his household. By doing so, he neither violated a divine command nor committed an unlawful act, but simply left aside what was permissible. For this reason, the verse is best understood as a gentle reproach (ʿitāb) and a divine lesson, not a condemnation.
The wording of the verse highlights that forbidding something lawful upon oneself is not equivalent to declaring it unlawful in religion. Al-Ṭabarsī explains that the Prophet’s action amounted to a self-imposed restriction, comparable to an oath of abstinence, and Allah clarified that such restrictions fall under the rulings of oaths (aymān). Hence the next verse: “Allah has ordained for you the absolution of your oaths” (). The divine response was therefore not an accusation of wrongdoing but a clarification of the ruling: when a lawful thing is made forbidden upon oneself through an oath, its breaking requires expiation, not that the act itself is blameworthy.
Al-Ṭabarsī notes that scholars differed on how to classify such a statement. Abū Ḥanīfah held that if a man says to his wife “you are forbidden to me,” it counts as an oath, and breaking it requires expiation. Mālik held that the effect depends on intention: if one intends divorce, it counts as divorce; if one intends ẓihār (a pre-Islamic form of separation), it counts as ẓihār; and if neither is intended, then it is an oath. Al-Shāfiʿī regarded such a statement as either divorce or ẓihār depending on intention, but meaningless if no such intent was present. Ibn Masʿūd, Ibn ʿAbbās, and ʿAṭāʾ, however, maintained that it is simply an oath, which is also the position of Al-Ṭabarsī and the Shīʿī school.
What emerges from Al-Ṭabarsī’s analysis is that the incident reflects a point of divine instruction: the Prophet (s.a.w.) is taught, and through him the community is taught, that lawful things should not be prohibited in pursuit of people’s pleasure. The gentle reproach, framed in words of divine mercy and forgiveness, is a pedagogical moment rather than a rebuke for sin. The Prophet’s act was not disobedience; it was an act of self-restraint motivated by consideration for his wives, which Allah corrected to reaffirm the principle that only He determines what is ḥalāl and ḥarām.
Thus, in Al-Ṭabarsī’s tafsīr, the incident becomes an illustration of the Prophet’s humanity and his concern for the sensitivities of his family, but it in no way compromises his infallibility. The Qur’an’s corrective address is understood not as an indictment of sin, but as clarification of divine law and reassurance of the Prophet’s elevated status.
Source: Majmaʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 10 (Qom: Dār al-ʿIlm), commentary on Q. 66:1-2.
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī
In his commentary, Ṭabāṭabāʾī frames the divine address to the Prophet (s.a.w.) as a gentle censure concerning a personal matter, distinct from his mission as a messenger. The Qur’an asks, “O Prophet! Why do you forbid yourself what God has made lawful for you, seeking thereby to please your wives?” (). By addressing him here as “prophet” (nabī) rather than “messenger” (rasūl), the verse signals that the issue pertains to his personal affair rather than to legislation for the community.
According to Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the Prophet had taken an oath to abstain from something permitted by God in order to placate his wives, who disliked his action. The Qur’an does not identify what this was, but makes clear that it was not a prohibited act in itself—rather, the Prophet swore to desist from something otherwise lawful, effectively forbidding himself through oath what God had allowed. Thus the “forbidding” (taḥrīm) mentioned in the verse does not mean instituting a new legal prohibition in the shari‘ah sense. The Prophet had no such authority to legislate independently. Rather, the meaning is that he personally bound himself through an oath not to do something permitted.
The verse rebukes this action, pointing out that his motive was to please his wives. In doing so, Ṭabāṭabāʾī explains, the censure is implicitly directed toward the wives as well, who pressured him into such a concession. This is reinforced later in the surah, where two of the Prophet’s wives are directly addressed and urged to repent (). At the same time, the divine reminder closes with reassurance: “And God is Forgiving, Merciful” (), highlighting that the matter is corrected through divine pardon and mercy.
The following verse () provides the remedy: “God has indeed sanctioned for you the expiation of your oaths; and God is your Protector, and He is the All-Knowing, the All-Wise.” Here Ṭabāṭabāʾī draws on al-Rāghib’s linguistic insight that the Qur’an uses two distinct formulations: when God says “faraḍa ʿalā” (“ordained upon”), it denotes a binding obligation upon all Muslims, Prophet included; but when He says “faraḍa li” (“ordained for”), it signals a divine allowance specific to the Prophet. In this case, “faraḍa Allāhu lakum” (God has sanctioned for you) means that the Prophet is not bound to keep his oath by abstaining from what God made lawful; rather, God has decreed the lawful avenue of dissolving such oaths through expiation (kaffārah).
The term taḥillah in the verse—literally “dissolving” or “allowing”—refers to the prescribed means of undoing the binding force of an oath. Thus the verse conveys that breaking such a self-imposed prohibition is not blameworthy when accompanied by the proper expiation. God, who is the Prophet’s Protector and the Guardian of the believers, has clarified this principle out of His wisdom and care.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī concludes that these verses show the Prophet had indeed sworn to renounce something permissible, but was instructed to rescind that oath through the lawful mechanism of expiation. In this way, the Qur’an corrects his personal action, protects the integrity of divine law, and reminds both the Prophet and his household that the limits of lawful and unlawful rest solely with God, whose governance is guided by knowledge and wisdom.
Source: Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān, Eng. Vol. 38 under Chapter 66, Verses 1-2 (Tawheed Institute, Australia).
Read ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s full commentary in Tafsir al-Mizan: 66:1–9 on almizan.org ↗
Our reflection
This is our own reflection on the readings above. It is one way of reading the comparison, offered to encourage further thought rather than as the final word.
The opening verses of Sūrah al-Taḥrīm () have been approached by Mawdūdī, al-Qurṭubī, Al-Ṭabarsī, and Ṭabāṭabāʾī in ways that converge upon a shared understanding: the Qur’an here records not a sin of the Prophet (s.a.w.) but a moment of divine pedagogy, a gentle reproach intended to preserve the clarity of divine legislation while at the same time revealing the Prophet’s humanity and his deep concern for his household. Each exegete highlights that the Prophet’s action was not an unlawful transgression but a self-imposed abstention from something God had permitted, undertaken in order to please his wives, and that the swift divine correction was necessary only because of the potential consequences for how the community might perceive divine law.
Mawdūdī’s interpretation highlights the rhetorical nature of the Qur’anic opening. “Why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you, seeking to please your wives?” is not, in his view, a genuine inquiry but a rhetorical reproach, an expression of divine disapproval meant to convey that such a step, though minor and well-intentioned, was unfitting for the Prophet’s exalted position. The Prophet’s abstention, Mawdūdī explains, was motivated not by ascetic scruple but by extraordinary sensitivity toward his wives. Yet because the Prophet’s life was the model for the Muslim community, even a small personal vow of abstinence could easily be misconstrued as divine legislation. His companions might assume the abstained-from item had become forbidden, or they might conclude that it was acceptable for believers themselves to forbid what God had made lawful. In this way, a private gesture of affection could inadvertently distort the structure of divine law. For Mawdūdī, this explains why Allah intervened immediately: not as a punishment for sin, but as a protection of revelation’s integrity. He also emphasizes that the wives were indirectly addressed here, for their pressure had drawn the Prophet into a situation with unintended communal implications, and they too were reminded of the special responsibility that came with belonging to his household. While Mawdūdī records both the Māriyah and honey narratives, he ultimately sides with the stronger chain of transmission found in the Ṣaḥīḥayn, which recounts the honey incident, and he notes the ensuing juristic debates on whether self-prohibition counts as an oath. His conclusion is that it does, and thus the Prophet was instructed to dissolve his oath through expiation and resume what God had permitted.
Al-Qurṭubī’s analysis follows a parallel course. He too privileges the honey narrative as the most authentic background to the verse, though he acknowledges that other reports exist, including that concerning Māriyah the Copt. For him, however, these are weaker and cannot stand beside the Bukhārī and Muslim accounts. He stresses that the Prophet’s decision to abstain should be classified as tark al-awlā, leaving aside what was better, rather than as sin. It was an act born of kindness and a desire to maintain harmony in his household, but left uncorrected, it could have confused the boundary between divine law and personal preference. By treating the Prophet’s words “I will not return to it” as an oath, and then pointing to the absolution of oaths in verse 2, the Qur’an preserved clarity: the act was not a new prohibition but an oath, and oaths can be broken through expiation. In this way, God ensured that His law remained distinct from the Prophet’s domestic accommodations. Al-Qurṭubī thus frames the episode not as a flaw in the Prophet but as a teaching moment for the ummah, demonstrating that God alone decides what is lawful and unlawful and that even the Prophet’s household must take care not to draw him into situations that obscure this truth. The closing reassurance, “And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful,” further highlights the gentleness of the correction.
Al-Ṭabarsī adopts a similar interpretive framework, making clear from the outset that this was not an episode of sin but of divine instruction. Whether the background was honey or Māriyah, the essential point is the same: the Prophet had imposed upon himself a restriction out of consideration for his wives, thereby binding himself through an oath not to partake of something God had permitted. For Al-Ṭabarsī, the Qur’an’s language of “forbidding” should be understood in this sense—not as a legislative act but as a self-imposed restriction. Verse 2 then immediately clarifies the principle that such restrictions are treated as oaths and can be dissolved through expiation. His commentary also uses the occasion to review the legal debates about whether statements like “you are forbidden to me” count as divorce, ẓihār, or an oath. While some Sunni jurists distinguished according to intention, Al-Ṭabarsī records the Shīʿī position that such statements are simply oaths requiring expiation, never divorce. This situates the passage within the larger legal discourse of Islamic law. Theologically, Al-Ṭabarsī insists that the Prophet’s infallibility remains intact, since the action was not disobedience but a humanly motivated concession. The divine reproach, cast in the language of forgiveness and mercy, reveals not weakness but the protective care of God, who ensured that His Messenger left no precedent that could mislead the community.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, likewise, interprets the verses as a personal correction rather than a censure of prophetic failure. He pays close attention to the wording, noting that the Qur’an addresses the Prophet here as “nabī” (Prophet) rather than “rasūl” (Messenger), indicating that the matter pertains to his personal life and not to his legislative mission. In his view, the Prophet had sworn to abstain from something permissible in order to appease his wives, and by doing so, he effectively forbade himself what God had allowed. This was not a legislative act—something the Prophet could never do—but a personal oath of abstinence. The rebuke is directed not only at him but also at the wives whose pressure created the situation, as is made explicit later in verse 4 of the same sūrah. Ṭabāṭabāʾī also draws on al-Rāghib’s linguistic distinction between the Qur’anic expressions faraḍa ʿalā (ordained upon) and faraḍa li- (ordained for). In this passage, God uses faraḍa lakum (“ordained for you”), signaling that what is provided is a divine allowance—the expiation of oaths—by which the Prophet could dissolve his self-imposed restriction. Thus, the abstention was never binding in the sense of divine law, and its correction became a general principle for all believers: personal oaths that restrict lawful things are treated as oaths and require expiation, but they cannot redefine what God has permitted. For Ṭabāṭabāʾī, this ensures that prophetic infallibility is preserved, divine law remains entirely in God’s hands, and the Prophet’s humanity is acknowledged without ever compromising his status as a perfect model protected by God’s mercy.
Taken together, these four interpretations present a remarkably consistent picture despite their differences in emphasis. All regard the Prophet’s abstention as a minor, human act born of affection toward his wives; all insist it was not a sin but an act of self-denial that required immediate correction to protect the clarity of divine law; all read verse 2 as establishing the principle that such abstentions are oaths requiring expiation, not true prohibitions; and all underscore that God’s mercy and wisdom ensured that the Prophet’s example remained flawless as guidance for the community. Mawdūdī stresses the public consequences of even small personal gestures, al-Qurṭubī gives the moral-legal classification of tark al-awlā, Al-Ṭabarsī situates the event within Shīʿī legal doctrine regarding oaths, and Ṭabāṭabāʾī highlights the linguistic and contextual nuances that frame the matter as personal correction. In the end, the incident is less about domestic quarrels and more about divine pedagogy: through this gentle correction, God safeguarded the absolute distinction between His law and human preference, while reminding the believers that His mercy and wisdom govern even the Prophet’s most personal affairs.
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