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Sūrah al-Baqarah, verse 124
وَإِذِ ابْتَلَىٰ إِبْرَاهِيمَ رَبُّهُ بِكَلِمَاتٍ فَأَتَمَّهُنَّ ۖ قَالَ إِنِّي جَاعِلُكَ لِلنَّاسِ إِمَامًا ۖ قَالَ وَمِن ذُرِّيَّتِي ۖ قَالَ لَا يَنَالُ عَهْدِي الظَّالِمِينَ
Wa idhi ibtala Ibrahima rabbuhu bi-kalimatin fa-atammahunna qala inni ja'iluka li'n-nasi imaman qala wa min dhurriyyati qala la yanalu 'ahdi az-zalimin
When his Lord tested Abraham with certain words, and he fulfilled them, He said, 'I am making you the Imam of mankind.' Said he, 'And from among my descendants?' He said, 'My pledge does not extend to the unjust.'
Context and significance
This verse stands at the heart of Qur’anic discussions on leadership and divine authority. It describes a moment after Abraham (a.s.) had already attained the rank of prophet and messenger, yet was elevated further to become an Imam for humanity. Several profound questions arise here:
What were the “certain words” with which Abraham was tested, and what does it mean that he fulfilled them? Are these trials to be understood as specific historical commands such as migration, sacrifice, or as a broader series of divine tests that demonstrated Abraham’s perfection in obedience?
What is the nature of imāmah itself, and how is it distinct from prophethood and messengership? If Abraham had already been chosen as God’s prophet, what additional role does imāmah signify, and why was it granted only after he had successfully completed his tests?
Abraham’s immediate plea, “And from among my descendants?” also raises important questions. Does this request establish a principle of hereditary leadership, or does it indicate only Abraham’s concern for continuity of divine guidance within his lineage? And why does God respond with the decisive condition: “My pledge does not extend to the unjust”? The exegetes and their exegetical work selected for this study are Ibn Kathir, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Al-Tabarsi and Al-Qurtubi.
What the exegetes say
At a glance
The question: What is the imāmah given to Ibrāhīm, and is it something beyond the prophethood he already had?
Ibn KathīrTreats imāmah as leadership and an example to follow, awarded for completing his trials; does not set it apart from his prophethood, and reads “the unjust” as unfit for religious or civic office.
ʿAllāmah ṬabāṭabāʾīHolds that imāmah is a station above prophethood, given late in Ibrāhīm’s life: inner guidance “by God’s command”, which requires infallibility; “the unjust” excludes anyone who ever did wrong.
Al-ṬabarsīSees imāmah as a covenant distinct from and greater than prophethood, since Ibrāhīm was already a prophet; excluding anyone ever unjust means the imām must be infallible.
Al-QurṭubīTakes imām to mean a leader and model to be followed in faith and conduct; does not distinguish it from prophethood, and draws from the verse that rulers must be just.
How each exegete answers the question, in one line. Click a name to read his reading in full.
Ibn Kathīr
In his commentary on verse , Ibn Kathīr presents the episode of Prophet Ibrāhīm (a.s.) being tested with divine commands as a decisive moment that elevated him to the status of Imām for mankind. He interprets the verse as signifying that Allah (s.w.t.) imposed upon Ibrāhīm a series of trials, which he fulfilled with complete obedience, and as a result Allah declared him to be a leader and model for the people. Ibn Kathīr frames this as both an honor and a reward for Ibrāhīm's lifelong fidelity to Tawḥīd and steadfastness in carrying out God's will. The Qur'an itself confirms this stature in other passages, describing Ibrāhīm as one who fulfilled all divine commands, a nation in himself, upright and thankful, and one who was never among the polytheists. From these verses, Ibn Kathīr underscores that the Prophet Muḥammad (s.a.w.) and his followers are the true heirs of Ibrāhīm's religion, unlike those who merely claim to follow him without adhering to his uncompromising monotheism.
A major theme of the commentary revolves around the phrase "tested him with words." Ibn Kathīr records a wide range of opinions from early authorities about what these "words" were. Some traditions link them to the rites of ḥajj, while others explain them as acts of purification and fiṭrah, such as circumcision, trimming the mustache, using the siwāk, rinsing the mouth, inhaling water during ablution, shaving the pubic hair, plucking the underarm hair, and trimming the nails. He cites reports listing ten practices of this kind, sometimes called acts of fiṭrah, and other narrations that list five. Beyond ritual practices, another body of reports interprets the "words" as the major trials in Ibrāhīm's life: his dispute with Nimrod about God's lordship, his patience when he was cast into the fire, his migration when commanded, his generous hosting of guests despite hardship, and the most difficult test of all, his readiness to sacrifice his son. Ibn Kathīr gathers these narrations together to emphasize that whether the trials were ritual in nature or severe existential challenges, Ibrāhīm fulfilled them all, and it was on account of this fulfillment that he was made an Imām.
When Allah conferred upon him this role of leadership, Ibrāhīm prayed that his descendants might also be granted the same honor. Ibn Kathīr highlights Allah's response, "My covenant does not include the wrongdoers," as a critical qualification. While Allah accepted Ibrāhīm's supplication in part—since every prophet after Ibrāhīm was indeed from among his descendants—He also made clear that divine leadership and covenant cannot be extended to those among his offspring who are unjust. Ibn Kathīr stresses that this principle excludes wrongdoers from positions of religious and moral authority even if they are biologically connected to Ibrāhīm. The covenant, he explains, is limited to the righteous and excludes those who commit injustice, whether polytheism or other forms of wrongdoing.
Ibn Kathīr further generalizes the meaning of this exclusion to a broader principle: the unjust are not suitable to hold positions of authority in religion or society. He quotes scholars who argued that such individuals are unfit to be khalīfahs, judges, witnesses, or even transmitters of ḥadīth, since divine trust and guidance cannot rest upon those who wrong themselves or others. This interpretive move shows how Ibn Kathīr extends the verse's implications beyond the case of Ibrāhīm's descendants to establish a timeless rule about justice being an essential condition for religious and communal leadership.
In this way, Ibn Kathīr's commentary presents Ibrāhīm as the epitome of obedience and submission, a figure who rose to leadership through enduring trials of both ritual practice and profound sacrifice. His elevation as Imām becomes a model for humanity, while the divine restriction of leadership to the just safeguards the purity of religion from corruption. The verse thus combines the celebration of Ibrāhīm's unique rank with a universal principle: true authority in matters of faith belongs only to those who are righteous, while the unjust are forever excluded from Allah's covenant.
Source: Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged). Translated by Ṣafī al-Raḥmān. Vol. 1 (Chapter 2, Verse 124) Riyadh: Maktaba Dār-us-Salām, 2003.
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī begins his exegesis of verse by situating it within the broader Qur'anic narrative of Abraham (a.s.). The verse inaugurates a new section dealing with Abraham's trials, his imamate, the building of the Kaʿbah, and the foundations of Islamic worship such as prayer, qiblah, and ḥajj. According to Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the granting of imamate to Abraham occurred late in his life, after his children Ishmael and Isaac had been born. This is evident from Abraham's supplication, "And of my offspring?" which presumes certainty that he had descendants.
The Qur'an describes Abraham as having been "tried with certain words." Ṭabāṭabāʾī interprets these "words" not as speech alone but as divine commands manifest through actions and trials—events that tested Abraham's obedience and faith. These included his opposition to idolatry, his ordeal with the fire, his migration, and above all, the supreme trial of the near-sacrifice of his son. Having fulfilled these tests, Abraham was raised to the lofty rank of imamate.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī distinguishes imamate from other related concepts such as prophethood, messengership, khilāfah, or leadership in temporal affairs. Prophethood conveys divine revelation, while messengership entails delivering it to the people. Imamate, however, is a unique, divinely bestowed quality whereby the imam possesses intrinsic authority, guiding people "by God's command." This guidance is not merely showing the way, as prophets and preachers do, but actively leading people to their ultimate destination through a connection with the divine command (amr), the metaphysical side of creation.
He also critiques the view of some exegetes who attempt to reduce imāmah here to either prophethood or messengership. This, he argues, debases the word and ignores the verse's sequence. Abraham was already both a prophet and a messenger when God granted him imamate; thus, the verse cannot be merely reiterating what he already had. Furthermore, Abraham's request, "And of my offspring?" would make little sense if imamate were identical with prophethood, since he already knew prophethood was not hereditary. Rather, the divine response—"My covenant does not include the unjust"—shows that imamate is a distinct office, hereditary but restricted only to the sinless. This confirms that imamate is an additional and higher rank, not reducible to prophethood or messengership.
Drawing on verses such as and , Ṭabāṭabāʾī defines imamate as guardianship (wilāyah) over people's actions and inner lives, with comprehensive knowledge of their deeds and a direct link to the divine command that governs creation. The imamate, then, requires two essential qualities: absolute patience in trials and unwavering certainty in God's signs. Abraham himself achieved certainty when God showed him the "kingdom of the heavens and the earth" (), a vision that led to the fullness of his certitude.
From this, Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues that the imam must necessarily be maʿṣūm (infallible). Since an imam is to guide others, he must himself be free from sin and error; otherwise, he would be in need of guidance. The Qur'an confirms this when it states, "My covenant will not include the unjust." Here, "unjust" covers every person tainted by any form of injustice—whether polytheism, sin, or wrongdoing—at any stage of life. By logical division, the only ones eligible for imamate are those who have never committed injustice, i.e., the infallible.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī further asserts that the imamate is a perpetual necessity. The Qur'an's statement, "the Day We shall call every people with their imam" (), shows that no people can exist without an imam. Thus, the earth is never devoid of a rightful divinely appointed leader. Imamate is also hereditary within the progeny of Abraham, though restricted to those free of injustice. Abraham's prayer, "And of my offspring?" was partly accepted: the imamate would indeed remain in his descendants but never include the unjust among them.
From this analysis, Ṭabāṭabāʾī extracts several foundational principles: 1) Imamate is a divinely appointed covenant, not a humanly delegated office. 2) The imam must be infallible. 3) The earth is never without a rightful imam. 4) The imam is sustained by divine assistance. 5) He has access to the inner realities of human deeds. 6) He possesses comprehensive knowledge of what people require for their worldly and spiritual welfare. 7) No one can surpass the imam in virtue.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī concludes that imamate is the completion of Abraham's spiritual journey, a rank above prophethood and messengership, reserved for those of absolute purity. It embodies God's ongoing covenant with humanity through Abraham's lineage, ensuring that divine guidance remains present in every era through an infallible guide.
Source: Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān, Eng. Vol. 2 under Chapter 2, Verse 124 (WOFIS, Iran).
Read ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s full commentary in Tafsir al-Mizan: 2:124 on almizan.org ↗
Al-Ṭabarsī
The Qur'an narrates that when Abraham was tested by his Lord with certain words and fulfilled them, Allah said to him: "Indeed, I am making you an Imām for the people." Abraham then asked whether this covenant would extend to his descendants, to which Allah replied: "My covenant does not extend to the wrongdoers." Al-Ṭabarsī explains that the verse establishes the lofty status of Abraham after he had already attained prophethood, for imāmah is a higher and more comprehensive station. Prophethood involves receiving revelation, but imāmah extends to guiding people, administering their affairs, protecting divine law, and leading the community in both worldly and religious matters.
The words with which Abraham was tested have been interpreted in various ways. Some commentators saw them as a general reference to the obligations and commands of God that Abraham carried out with complete obedience. Others pointed to particular trials such as his being cast into the fire, his migration from his homeland, his willingness to sacrifice his son, and his circumcision at old age. Still others said they were the ten practices of natural disposition, such as trimming the moustache, clipping the nails, shaving pubic hair, and circumcision, or that they were the rites of pilgrimage. Some traditions indicate that the trials included his confrontation with the worshippers of the stars, moon, and sun. Shīʿī narrations add another layer of meaning, identifying the "words" as the names of the Prophet, ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, al-Ḥasan, and al-Ḥusayn, through which Adam sought forgiveness, and by which Abraham fulfilled his test and was raised to the station of imāmah.
Having succeeded in every trial, Abraham was granted leadership for humanity. The Qur'an's language indicates that this appointment was not merely honorary, but a covenant of divine authority, making him a model to be followed. Abraham, out of concern for his progeny, asked whether this covenant would extend to his descendants. God's response was decisive: His covenant would not reach the wrongdoers. Al-Ṭabarsī stresses that this establishes a principle that imāmah is divinely appointed and restricted to those who are pure and righteous. It cannot be given to those who have ever engaged in wrongdoing. The verse, in its general form, excludes from imāmah anyone who committed injustice, whether through disbelief, sin, or moral corruption.
Some attempted to argue that a wrongdoer who repents may still qualify, but Al-Ṭabarsī rejects this. The verse does not restrict itself to a specific time, and its generality shows that anyone who was at any point a wrongdoer is excluded. Thus, only those who were never unjust are eligible, which is understood by Shīʿī scholars as proof that the imām must be infallible. For if a person is not infallible, then he must be either a wrongdoer in the present or one who has committed wrong in the past, and therefore excluded by the Qur'anic principle.
In this way, the verse portrays imāmah as a covenant distinct from prophethood and greater in scope, for Abraham was already a prophet when he was elevated to this station. It links imāmah with divine choice, moral purity, and the responsibility of guiding humanity. It also becomes a basis for the Shīʿī doctrine that the imām must be appointed by God and must possess infallibility, as only such a leader can truly embody the covenant that "does not extend to the wrongdoers."
Source: Majmaʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 1 (Qom: Dār al-ʿIlm), commentary on Q. 2:124.
Al-Qurṭubī
Al-Qurṭubī situates verse within the broader context of the Kaʿbah and the qiblah, reminding that Abraham (a.s.) was the one who built the Sacred House. Because the Jews traced their ancestry to him, they were expected to follow his religion rather than turn away from it. The verse recalls how God tested Abraham with kalimāt—"words" or commands—and how he fulfilled them completely, earning the lofty position of Imam for humanity.
Scholars disagreed on the meaning of these "words." Some said they referred to the full set of religious duties of Islam—repentance, worship, humility, honesty, and so on. Others held that they referred to particular commandments such as prayer, zakāt, ḥajj, ritual purification, and even the great trial of the near-sacrifice of his son. Ibn ʿAbbās transmitted that they were ten practices of purity, some concerning the head (like trimming the mustache, rinsing the mouth, cleaning the nose, brushing the teeth, and parting the hair), and others concerning the body (like clipping nails, shaving the pubic hair, circumcision, cleaning the underarms, and washing after relieving oneself). Another view was that they were specifically the rites of ḥajj. Al-Qurṭubī notes that these opinions are not contradictory; rather, they reflect different aspects of the many trials that God placed upon Abraham, all of which he faithfully fulfilled.
When Abraham successfully passed these trials, God addressed him: "I am making you an Imam for mankind." The word Imam here means a leader, guide, or exemplar. Just as a path or thread may be called an imam because it leads or directs, Abraham was made a model for others to follow in belief, devotion, and righteous conduct. Thus, God elevated him to a position of leadership not only for his own people but as a paradigm for all generations of the faithful.
Abraham then supplicated: "And from my descendants?" He longed that this covenant of leadership extend to his progeny as well. God replied: "My covenant does not reach the wrongdoers." In this, Abraham was informed that divine leadership cannot be granted indiscriminately to all his offspring. Among them would be both the righteous and the disobedient; only the former would be eligible for this honor. Ibn ʿAbbās explained that Abraham asked for imamate for his children, but God made clear that those among them who fall into wrongdoing and injustice are excluded.
Al-Qurṭubī notes that scholars interpreted the term "covenant" (ʿahd) in various ways: some said it meant prophethood, others imamate, others faith, religion, mercy, or God's command itself. However, the central point is that this divine trust is never extended to the unjust. This principle has major implications for leadership in Islam.
Jurists and theologians drew from this verse that the rightful Imam must be just, virtuous, and capable of carrying out his duties. A ruler who is unjust or oppressive is not truly fit for such a role. Some groups—such as a portion of the Muʿtazila and the Khawārij—argued on this basis that unjust rulers must be opposed and overthrown. However, the majority of scholars considered patience with a sinful ruler to be preferable, since rebellion often unleashes greater harm, bloodshed, and chaos. Thus, while the verse establishes the ideal principle that imamate belongs only to the just, its practical application became a subject of debate in political theory.
Al-Qurṭubī also pauses on linguistic points, such as the origin of the word dhurriyya (offspring), explaining its etymology and variant recitations. He clarifies that here it refers specifically to Abraham's children, though the term in other Qur'ānic contexts can mean both ancestors and descendants.
In conclusion, the verse affirms Abraham's station as a model of faith and obedience, elevating him to the position of Imam for all people. Yet it also sets a boundary: leadership and divine trust are not matters of bloodline alone, but of righteousness. God's covenant is for the faithful and the just, not for the wrongdoers. This principle became a cornerstone in Islamic thought, both in theology and law, shaping the understanding of who is worthy of guidance, authority, and emulation.
Source: Al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī), Vol. 2, under Surah al-Baqarah, Ayah 124, Pub. by Al-Risalah Foundation, Beirut.
Our reflection
This is our own reflection on the readings above. It is one way of reading the comparison, offered to encourage further thought rather than as the final word.
Read across the major commentaries, two very different pictures of imāmah emerge. Ibn Kathīr and al-Qurṭubī treat the verse chiefly as a tribute to Abraham’s obedience and as a juridical maxim that unjust people are unfit for authority. They catalogue the “words” with which Abraham was tried (fiṭrah rites, ḥajj rituals, or his great life-tests) and then generalize: leadership must be tied to justice. Valuable as that ethic is, their readings largely collapse imāmah into familiar offices—prophethood, exemplary leadership, or political rule—and so they leave unaddressed why Abraham is granted imāmah after already being a prophet and messenger, and why he immediately asks, “and from my offspring?” Their approach is rich in narrations and practical implications, but thin on the verse’s distinctive theological claim.
By contrast, Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Al-Ṭabarsī insist that marks a new divine covenant, distinct from prophethood. They foreground the sequence of the verse (late in Abraham’s life, post-offspring) to show that imāmah cannot simply equal nubuwwah/risālah. For Ṭabāṭabāʾī, imāmah is a perpetual, God-bestowed guardianship (wilāyah) by which the Imām “guides by Our command”—a guidance that is more than teaching; it is a divinely sustained authority over the community’s spiritual trajectory. From “My covenant does not reach the unjust,” he argues that eligibility requires life-long freedom from injustice, i.e., ʿiṣmah. He then locates this office within the Qur’anic economy of leadership (; ; ), concluding that the earth is never without a rightful imām.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī goes further still, exposing the metaphysical dimensions of imāmah. Unlike prophethood, which conveys revelation, imāmah ensures that revelation is embodied, preserved, and actualized in history. The Imām is not only the custodian of the sharīʿah but also the channel of divine command (amr), which underlies the order of creation itself. In his analysis, the verse’s timing—Abraham being raised to imāmah only after trials that perfected his patience (ṣabr) and certainty (yaqīn)—signals that this office requires a soul who has reached the utmost degree of spiritual maturity. Such a figure, wholly purified from injustice, is uniquely qualified to govern both outward law and inward guidance. Thus, imāmah emerges not as a political arrangement, but as the very axis of divine-human relation after prophethood.
Al-Ṭabarsī reaches a similar destination through a more report-driven path. He preserves the range of earlier views about the “words,” but stitches them to Shīʿī narrations that make Abraham’s trial a prefiguration of the Ahl al-Bayt’s imāmah. “My covenant” becomes hereditary yet restricted: it excludes anyone tainted by injustice at any time, thereby entailing infallibility. If a critique applies, it is that Al-Ṭabarsī leans more on transmitted reports than on internal textual logic; yet his conclusion dovetails with Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s more systematic argument.
When set side-by-side, the fault lines are clear:
- What is granted? Ibn Kathīr/al-Qurṭubī: honorific leadership and a rule about justice. Ṭabāṭabāʾī/Al-Ṭabarsī: a distinct covenantal office beyond prophethood.
- Who can bear it? Ibn Kathīr/al-Qurṭubī: the just among Abraham’s progeny (practically read as upright rulers/judges). Ṭabāṭabāʾī/Al-Ṭabarsī: only those never touched by injustice—therefore divinely protected (maʿṣūm).
- Why the timing and the prayer for progeny? Best explained if imāmah is not identical to prophethood, but the consummation of Abraham’s journey and the template for continued, hereditary divine guidance.
Accordingly, the most coherent synthesis treats as the Qur’an’s charter for imāmah: a perpetual, divinely appointed guardianship that perfects the Abrahamic mission and cannot be vested in the unjust. Ibn Kathīr and al-Qurṭubī preserve crucial ethical lessons (no legitimacy for oppressors), but they under-theorize the verse’s distinctive office. Ṭabāṭabāʾī, supported in substance by Al-Ṭabarsī, recovers the verse’s full theological weight: imāmah is a unique covenant—hereditary in Abraham’s line, restricted to the sinless, rooted in divine wilāyah, and necessary for the community’s ongoing guidance. It is, in his analysis, the final stage of Abraham’s ascent and the perpetual safeguard of religion after prophethood, ensuring that divine command continues to govern human destiny through living, infallible leaders.
What is your reflection?
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