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Sūrah al-Raʿd, verse 43 ​

Verses › Sūrah al-Raʿd · Qur’an 13:43 · 4 exegetes

وَيَقُولُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ لَسْتَ مُرْسَلاً قُلْ كَفَى بِاللَّهِ شَهِيدًا بَيْنِي وَبَيْنَكُمْ وَمَنْ عِندَهُ عِلْمُ الْكِتَابِ

Wa yaqūlu alladhīna kafarū lasta mursalan, qul kafā bi-llāhi shahīdan baynī wa baynakum wa man ʿindahu ʿilmu al-kitāb.

The faithless say, ‘You have not been sent (by Allah).’ Say, ‘Allah suffices as a witness between me and you, and he who possesses the knowledge of the Book.’

Knowledge & the BookFaithlessKnowledge of the BookOpponents in MeccaWitnessing

Context and significance ​

Verse brings Sūrah al-Raʿd to a close with a direct response to the Prophet’s opponents in Mecca who denied his messengership.

The verse is striking in both form and substance. It introduces the idea of dual testimony: first, God’s own witness, and second, the testimony of “he who possesses knowledge of the Book.” This formulation immediately prompts searching questions. Who is this second witness? Why is their testimony placed alongside God’s? What role does human testimony play in establishing the truth of divine revelation? And why does the Qur’an choose to conclude the chapter with this particular assertion of proof?

The significance of the verse lies in how it addresses the core issue of prophetic legitimacy. Faced with denial, the Prophet is armed not only with God’s testimony but also with the witness of one endowed with complete knowledge of revelation. This duality suggests that divine truth is confirmed in both transcendent and accessible ways: God bears witness through His word, and a human figure embodies that knowledge within the community. The verse therefore raises fundamental theological questions about the nature of proof, the necessity of human witnesses alongside divine testimony, and the way God ensures that His Messenger is never left unsupported before his deniers.

It is precisely these questions—and the far-reaching implications they hold for understanding authority, knowledge, and continuity in Islam—that make verse a critical point of study.

What the exegetes say ​

At a glance

The question: Who is the second witness, 'he who possesses knowledge of the Book', whose testimony stands beside God's against the Prophet's deniers?

Fakhr al-Dīn al-RāzīRecords four views without choosing: believing People of the Book such as Ibn Salām, the Qur'an itself, scholars of earlier scriptures, or God; stresses that God's testimony alone is decisive.
Al-QurṭubīLeans to scripture-bearers who recognised the Prophet and believed, possibly all believers who affirm the Qur'an; rejects the identification with ʿAlī as resting on an unsound ḥadīth.
ʿAllāmah ṬabāṭabāʾīIdentifies ʿAlī, on Ahl al-Bayt reports and Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn; rejects God (redundant) and the People of the Book (a later, circular witness in a Meccan sūrah), the Qur'an being God's own testimony.
Al-ṬabarsīCites the People of the Book and the prophets, but gives most weight to reports from Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Bāqir naming ʿAlī as the divinely ordained guide and interpreter of the Book.

How each exegete answers the question, in one line. Click a name to read his reading in full.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

1149-1210 CE · Shafi'i (Ash'ari)

In his commentary on the verse , al-Rāzī explains that the verse responds to the denials of the disbelievers who rejected the Prophet’s claim to be a messenger of Allah. The Qur’an answers them with two kinds of testimony.

The first testimony is Allah’s own, which is manifest through the miracles granted to the Prophet. These miracles serve as decisive proof of his truthfulness and represent the highest form of testimony, since the act of producing miracles demonstrates divine confirmation of his claim.

The second testimony is that of “whoever possesses knowledge of the Book.” Al-Rāzī explores this phrase in detail and records several interpretations. Some said it refers to the People of the Book who came to believe in the Prophet, such as ʿAbd Allāh ibn Salām, Salmān al-Fārisī, and Tamīm al-Dārī. Others understood it to mean the Qur’an itself, since its eloquence, comprehensiveness, and depth of knowledge are a continuing miracle and thus a testimony to his prophethood. A third view is that it refers to those with knowledge of earlier scriptures generally, who would recognize from their signs the truth of the Prophet’s mission. A fourth interpretation is that the phrase refers to Allah Himself, the ultimate possessor of the knowledge of the Book, with the wording of the verse understood as a description of Him.

Al-Rāzī also notes different readings of the phrase. In one, the familiar recitation “wa man ʿindahu ʿilmu l-kitāb” points to one who already possesses knowledge. In another, “wa man ʿindahu ʿulimu l-kitāb” signifies one to whom knowledge was given from Allah. He explains that in either case, the meaning is to establish a further testimony beyond Allah’s own, while emphasizing that Allah’s testimony is primary and sufficient.

Finally, al-Rāzī remarks on the rhetorical force of the verse: by beginning with Allah’s testimony and then mentioning another witness, the Qur’an highlights that divine testimony alone is decisive, while the second is mentioned only to reinforce the argument. The sūrah is concluded with this verse, closing on the affirmation that Allah’s witness is the ultimate proof of the Prophet’s truth.

Source: al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr aw Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb, vol. 10 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth), commentary on Q. 13:43.

Al-Qurṭubī

1214-1273 CE · Maliki (Ash'ari)

Regarding the verse , al-Qurṭubī discusses both the polemic of the unbelievers who rejected the Prophet (s.a.w.) and the weighty testimony invoked in his defense. The verse begins with the disbelievers’ claim: “You are not sent as a messenger.” According to Qatāda, this was said by the pagan Arabs who denied his prophethood when he did not fulfill the signs they demanded. God answers this objection by instructing the Prophet (s.a.w.) to declare: “God is sufficient as a witness between me and you, and so is the one who possesses knowledge of the Book.”

Al-Qurṭubī explains that God’s testimony is absolute, for He knows the truth of the Prophet’s mission and the falsehood of the disbelievers’ claims. The second testimony, however, has been the subject of much debate. Some commentators, including Qatāda, Saʿīd ibn Jubayr, and others, held that it refers to the believers among the People of the Book, such as ʿAbd Allāh ibn Salām, Salmān al-Fārisī, Tamīm al-Dārī, and the Negus. Their acceptance of Islam was taken as a decisive witness against the pagans, since these were men versed in scripture who recognized the Prophet (s.a.w.) in their own texts. A ḥadīth attributed to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Salām himself was transmitted, in which he stated that this verse was revealed concerning him, but al-Qurṭubī notes that the report is weak because the sūrah is Meccan while Ibn Salām only accepted Islam in Medina.

Others held a different view. Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Ḥasan, among others, argued that the one “who has knowledge of the Book” is in fact the angel Jibrīl, as he was entrusted with bringing down the revelation and thus possessed direct knowledge of the divine scripture. Another opinion is that it refers to God Himself, since He alone encompasses all knowledge of the Book, though this interpretation was considered a minority position. Still others, particularly within the Shīʿī tradition, identified the phrase with ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (a.s.), citing narrations such as “I am the city of knowledge and ʿAlī is its gate.” Al-Qurṭubī, however, rejects this attribution, considering the ḥadīth unsound and insisting that all the companions, including Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿUthmān, were also knowledgeable in the scripture and not to be excluded.

In his analysis, al-Qurṭubī leans toward a broader and more inclusive understanding: the phrase points to those who were bearers of earlier revelations, Jews and Christians who recognized the signs of the Prophet (s.a.w.) in their books and embraced Islam. It may also encompass all true believers who affirm the Qurʾān, recite it, and bear witness to the Messenger by its truth. Thus, the verse establishes a dual testimony—God’s direct affirmation and the confirmation of those grounded in scripture—against the denial of the disbelievers.

Source: Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī), Vol. 12, under Surah al-Ra'd, Ayah 43, Pub. by Al-Risalah Foundation, Beirut.

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī

1904-1981 CE · Shia (Twelver)

In his commentary on verse , ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī first clarifies that this testimony is not rhetorical or inaccessible, but a definitive argument. The statement “Allah suffices as a witness between me and you” invokes God’s affirmation of prophethood, a declaration already embedded within the Qur’an. Verses such as “You are indeed one of the messengers, on a straight path” () make God’s testimony explicit. For Ṭabāṭabāʾī, this testimony is not merely metaphorical—i.e., God’s “actions” as proofs of prophethood—but is grounded in His “speech,” the Qur’an itself, which is both miracle and revelation. To reduce this testimony to metaphor, as if it were only His external acts, misses the point. The Qur’an, by its miraculous eloquence and inimitable content, is itself God’s direct testimony to the authenticity of the Prophet’s mission. Thus, the phrase “Allah suffices as a witness between me and you” means precisely that the Qur’an’s affirmation of prophethood constitutes God’s testimony.

The second part of the verse—“and he who possesses the knowledge of the Book”—has been interpreted variously. Some claimed it refers to God Himself, “the One who knows what is in the Preserved Tablet.” But Ṭabāṭabāʾī dismisses this as stylistically forced, since it makes the conjunction redundant and convolutes the eloquence of the verse. Others argued that it refers to scholars of the Torah and Gospel who knew of the Prophet’s description, or to figures such as ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām who later embraced Islam. Yet this too is problematic, as the chapter is Meccan and no such scholars had yet borne testimony at the time. To suggest the verse promised a witness who would only appear later undermines its argumentative force: how could the Prophet’s opponents in Mecca be refuted by an eventual testimony that had not yet occurred? Even if testimony does not require belief, using the knowledge of non-Muslim scholars as evidence against other non-believers would collapse into circularity—since both denied the Prophet’s claim.

Some scholars instead identified “the Book” as the Qur’an itself. On this reading, “he who possesses the knowledge of the Book” would be anyone who truly comprehends it and testifies by its miraculous nature to its divine origin. This interpretation, ʿAllāmah notes, ties the end of the chapter to its opening verse: “These are the signs of the Book. That which has been sent down to you from your Lord is the truth, but most people do not believe” (). The Qur’an thus begins and ends with the same affirmation—that the Book itself is the supreme sign and testimony of the Prophet’s truth.

Yet, beyond these general interpretations, ʿAllāmah emphasizes the weight of transmitted reports that specify this verse as referring to Imam ʿAlī (a.s.). Numerous narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt affirm that “he who possesses the knowledge of the Book” designates ʿAlī, who was the most learned of the community in the Book of God and thus uniquely qualified to stand as its witness. This identification is consistent with the Prophet’s well-known saying in Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn: “Indeed, I am leaving among you two precious things: the Book of God and my progeny, the People of my House. The two shall never separate until they come to me at the Pool. If you hold onto them both, you will never go astray after me.” If the Qur’an itself is God’s testimony, then the one who possesses its knowledge—ʿAlī—stands as the human witness appointed alongside it.

This reading situates the verse firmly within the Meccan context. The challenge posed by the disbelievers is answered with two inseparable proofs: the eternal testimony of God through His Word, and the presence of a human witness among the Prophet’s own, whose mastery of the Book confirms its divine origin. Together, these constitute a final, unassailable argument: “Allah suffices as a witness between me and you, and he who possesses the knowledge of the Book.”

Source: Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān, Eng. Vol. 22 under Chapter 13, Verse 43 (Tawheed Institute, Australia).

Al-Ṭabarsī

1073-1154 CE · Shia (Twelver)

In his commentary on verse , Al-Ṭabarsī explores both the objection of the disbelievers and the profound response provided by the Qur’an. The disbelievers challenged the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) claim to messengership, denying his divine appointment and accusing him of fabrication. The verse instructs the Prophet (s.a.w.) to respond by appealing to two ultimate authorities: Allah (s.w.t.) Himself, and “he who possesses knowledge of the Book.”

Al-Ṭabarsī first explains that the mention of Allah as a witness is sufficient, for He is the one who validates and confirms the truth of His Messenger through revelation, signs, and miracles. But the second part of the verse—“he who possesses knowledge of the Book”—is the subject of much discussion.

He cites different interpretations:

Some commentators, such as al-Ḥasan, al-Ḍaḥḥāk, and Saʿīd ibn Jubayr, understood it to mean that the reference is to the People of the Book (Jews and Christians), who recognized from their scriptures the signs of the Prophet (s.a.w.).

Others, like Mujāhid, said it refers to the prophets themselves, who were witnesses to the truth of God’s message across time.

The most significant interpretation, reported from Ibn ʿAbbās, Abū Jaʿfar al-Bāqir (a.s.), and widely transmitted in Shīʿī sources, is that “the one who possesses knowledge of the Book” is ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (a.s.).

According to this reading, the verse does not merely affirm the Prophet’s mission through external witnesses, but also establishes a divinely appointed guide within the community who shares in the knowledge of the Book. Narrations support this view, such as the ḥadīth where the Prophet (s.a.w.) placed his hand on ʿAlī’s chest and said: “You are the warner, O Muḥammad, and you, O ʿAlī, are the guide. Through you, the guided will be guided after me.” Similar reports from Abū Hurayrah and Ibn ʿAbbās reinforce this interpretation, highlighting that ʿAlī was recognized as the one most knowledgeable of the Book after the Prophet (s.a.w.).

Al-Ṭabarsī emphasizes that the verse, therefore, carries both a general meaning and a specific designation. On one level, it indicates that the truth of the Prophet (s.a.w.) is witnessed by God and confirmed by those who know the scriptures. On another, more specific level, it identifies ʿAlī (a.s.) as the divinely ordained guide and interpreter of the Book after the Prophet (s.a.w.), establishing his unique authority in the unfolding of divine guidance.

Source: Majmaʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 6 (Qom: Dār al-ʿIlm), commentary on Q. 13:43.

Our reflection ​

This is our own reflection on the readings above. It is one way of reading the comparison, offered to encourage further thought rather than as the final word.

The verse under study closes Sūrah al-Raʿd with a decisive rebuttal to the Prophet’s deniers. Yet the exegetical tradition offers divergent readings of the “second witness,” producing interpretations that often weaken the verse’s argumentative force. It is here that ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s systematic critique proves decisive, exposing the shortcomings of other approaches and grounding the verse in a coherent theological vision.

Al-Rāzī records a catalogue of possibilities*—*the People of the Book, figures like ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām, the Qur’an itself, or even Allah as the possessor of the Book. Yet his encyclopedic inclusiveness dilutes the verse’s intent. By including interpretations that defer the witness to future converts (like Ibn Salām in Medina), he renders the verse ineffective as a proof against the Meccan deniers who first challenged the Prophet. Ṭabāṭabāʾī exposes this flaw: testimony in Qur’anic argumentation must be immediate and accessible, not postponed to later history. To suggest otherwise empties the verse of its polemical force. Similarly, al-Rāzī’s suggestion that the witness could be Allah Himself creates redundancy, for the verse already begins with God’s testimony.

Al-Qurṭubī leans toward identifying the witness with believing Jews and Christians who recognized the Prophet from their scriptures. But this too collapses under scrutiny. If they remained disbelievers, their recognition carries no argumentative weight against other disbelievers; if they believed later in Medina, they cannot serve as witnesses in the Meccan context of this verse. Moreover, grounding the Prophet’s defense in the testimony of People of the Book risks circular reasoning: the very group contesting his mission is invoked as proof of it. Ṭabāṭabāʾī rightly dismisses this as incoherent, since a disbeliever’s denial cannot be overturned by appealing to the authority of another disbeliever.

Other exegetes softened the difficulty by allegorizing the witness into “the Qur’an itself.” While this brings the verse closer to a sound meaning, Ṭabāṭabāʾī sharpens the point: the Qur’an is indeed God’s testimony*—His direct speech, not merely His acts—*and thus the primary divine witness. Yet the verse mentions two testimonies, not one. To collapse both into the Qur’an undermines the verse’s stylistic balance and fails to explain the duality.

It is in this light that the transmitted reports identifying “he who possesses knowledge of the Book” as ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (a.s.) become decisive. Ṭabāṭabāʾī stresses that testimony must be accessible, conclusive, and distinct from God’s own. The Qur’an itself confirms the Prophet’s mission as God’s testimony; alongside it, the one who possesses full knowledge of the Book*—embodied in ʿAlī—*stands as the human witness of divine truth. This interpretation alone satisfies the rhetorical symmetry of the verse, the Meccan polemical context, and the Qur’anic principle that God never leaves His messenger without a manifest proof accessible to his opponents.

Al-Ṭabarsī converges with this reasoning, emphasizing reports from Ibn ʿAbbās and the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt that restrict the witness to ʿAlī. While he preserves alternative opinions for completeness, his tafsīr affirms that the theological coherence of the verse lies precisely in recognizing a divinely appointed human witness within the Prophet’s community. Without this, the verse risks redundancy, deferral, or ineffectiveness.

In sum, when examined critically, the broad inclusiveness of al-Rāzī, the communalist reading of al-Qurṭubī, and the deflections of later exegetes all falter before the criteria Ṭabāṭabāʾī establishes: testimony must be immediate, accessible, non-redundant, and conclusive against the deniers. Only the dual interpretation*—God’s testimony through His Qur’an, and the human testimony of one who possesses full knowledge of it, namely ʿAlī—*preserves the argumentative integrity of the verse. Thus the final line of Sūrah al-Raʿd emerges not as a vague reassurance, but as a definitive Qur’anic proof of prophethood and of the enduring role of divinely appointed witnesses in safeguarding revelation.

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